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REINSTATEMENT CLAIMS UNDER THE FAMILY AND
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993: LEAVING BEHIND THE




Assume for a moment that you have been laid off from your
job during a medical leave taken to undergo treatment for a poten-
tially fatal heart condition.1  When probed as to the motivation be-
hind the layoff, your employer states that you have been chosen for
layoff simply because you are “already off.”2  Other management-
level employees have told you that the decision to lay you off was
made months prior to your medical leave.3  Disgruntled by the loss
of your position and your employer’s seemingly opportune use of
your leave as a basis for his decision, you initiate a lawsuit under the
Family and Medical Leave Act,4 seeking to be reinstated to your
former position.  However, at deposition, your employer states that
your layoff was the result of a decrease in workload and the demon-
strated ability of your co-workers to complete your duties in your
absence.5  How should the courts resolve this issue?
This note will argue that when a plaintiff files suit under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) alleging that her employer
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2004.  The author would like to thank
Professor Carlin Meyer for her invaluable guidance throughout the preparation of this
note, and the members of the Law Review for their contributions and assistance.
1. Fact adapted from the case of Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d
151, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1998).
2. Fact adapted from the case of Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1011
(7th Cir. 2000).
3. See id.  Although not obvious, the fact that a decision to terminate was made
months prior to a leave may be important because it tends to demonstrate an em-
ployer’s use of a leave as an illicit opportunity to “get rid of” an employee whom it
otherwise has no “good” reason to terminate.  For instance, the employee may merely
have an idiosyncratic habit that the employer does not like, and the employer is looking
for an easy way to terminate the employee.
4. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2003).
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578 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
failed to reinstate her to her former position upon returning from a
leave, the employee, to prevail at the summary judgment phase,
must prove6 that she was denied the right of reinstatement follow-
ing an FMLA-protected leave.  The employer may then affirmatively
defend himself by proving that the employee would have been ter-
minated regardless of her taking the leave.  This evidentiary
scheme, adopted by the Tenth Circuit in the case of Smith v. Diffee
Ford-Lincoln-Mercury,7 is preferable over the Seventh Circuit’s use of
the McDonnell Douglas8 test in Rice v. Sunrise Express9 and the Ninth
Circuit’s “negative factor” test formulated in Bachelder v. America
West Airlines.10 Part II of this Note surveys the FMLA’s legislative
history, and examines the scope of an employee’s rights under the
Act.11 Part III of this Note introduces three sources of confusion in
burden allocation of reinstatement claims: (1) two regulations
promulgated by the Department of Labor to implement the Act;
(2) a statutory “gap” left open by the language of the Act; and (3)
6. For purposes of this note, the terms “prove,” “burden of proof,” “burden of
proving,” or “burden of persuading” refer to both the burdens of producing evidence
to support one’s claim, and persuading the court that the evidentiary burden of that
claim has been met.  The term “burden of production” refers only to a burden of “pro-
ducing” evidence. In other words, a party bearing a burden of production need not
prove anything to the court, but need only furnish evidence to meet his burden.
7. Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 298 F.3d 955, 963-64 (10th Cir. 2002).
Although this case identifies the evidentiary scheme advocated in this paper, the Smith
court was following the precedent and reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in adopting
this approach, namely the cases of O’Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, 200 F.3d 1349,
1354 (11th Cir. 2000)(holding that “when an ‘eligible employee’ who was on FMLA
leave alleges her employer denied her FMLA right to reinstatement, the employer has
an opportunity to demonstrate it would have discharged the employee even had she
not been on FMLA leave”), and Parris v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 216 F.3d 1298, 1301
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that after an employee proves that she was denied her right
to reinstatement, the defendant-employer must prove that the decision to dismiss her
was “unrelated” to the her leave).  I chose to examine the Smith case in this note be-
cause it offers a recent discussion of the controversy amongst the circuits. For another
recent case succinctly explaining the circuit split and the various evidentiary ap-
proaches for prescriptive reinstatement claims, see Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp.,
234 F.Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J. 2002).
8. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell-
Douglas test is a tripartite evidentiary scheme crafted for use in disparate treatment
cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when direct evidence of
discrimination is lacking. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
9. Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000).
10. Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001).
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2004] FAMILY LEAVE ACT 579
the strange nature of the right to reinstatement as a statutorily lim-
ited right that does not depend on employer motive but, confusingly,
often involves such motive.12  Part III also examines how this confu-
sion has led the Seventh and Ninth Circuits to apply inappropriate
proof structures to FMLA reinstatement suits.13  Part IV will demon-
strate that the evidentiary approach identified in Smith v. Diffee
Ford–Lincoln-Mercury is the preferable approach because it defers to
the Department of Labor regulation meant to govern the burdens
of proof, mirrors the evidentiary schemes of similar legislation,
namely the National Labor Relations Act, and facilitates fairness in
FMLA litigation by forcing the party in control of the evidence to
furnish it.14
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
On February 5, 1993, President William Jefferson Clinton
signed into law the Family and Medical Leave Act.15  The Act, which
became effective on August 5, 1993, sought to “balance the de-
mands of the workplace with the needs of families”16 and “promote
the stability and economic security of families”17 by entitling quali-
fied employees to take a reasonable amount of leave18 to attend to
defined family and medical situations.  The legislation was pre-
ceded by congressional findings on the exponential increase of sin-
12. See discussion infra Part III.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See discussion infra Part IV.
15. See Donna Lenhoff and Claudia Withers, Implementation of the Family and Medi-
cal Leave Act: Toward The Family-Friendly Workplace, 3 Am. U.J. Gender & Law 39 (1994).
Lenhoff & Withers note that Representative Patricia Schroeder introduced the first
leave Act in the House of Representatives in 1985. Id. at 58. Prior to the 1988 Presiden-
tial election, candidate George Bush, Sr. stated: “We also need to assure that women
don’t have to worry about getting their jobs back after having a child or caring for a
child during a serious illness.” Id. at 67 n.4.  While in office, he exercised his Presiden-
tial veto to quash it twice. Id. at 39.  The Act was the first law the Clinton Administra-
tion signed. Id.
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)(2003).  Other purposes of the FMLA cited by Con-
gress include “promot[ing] the national interests in preserving family integrity,” id.,
and “the goal of equal employment for women and men,” id. § 2601(b)(5).
17. Id. § 2601(b)(1).
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gle-parent households19 and the lack of job security for women20
and persons with serious health conditions.21
The Act applies to all public employers22 and private employ-
ers with fifty or more employees.23  An employee is “qualified”
under the Act if she has been employed at the workplace for at least
twelve months24 and has worked a minimum of 1,250 hours within
those twelve months.25  Substantive, or prescriptive rights for quali-
fied employees include up to twelve weeks26 of unpaid leave27 each
19. See 29 U.S.C § 2601(a)(1).  Congress also found that the number of two-par-
ent families in which both parents are working is increasing, and noted the importance
of mother and father participation in “early childrearing” and care of family members
who are ill. Id. § 2601(a)(2).  Congress pointed to a lack of “employment policies” to
facilitate a balance between a parent’s workplace and family obligations. Id.
§ 2601(a)(3).
20. Id. § 2601(a)(5).  Congress found that women, who often assume primary re-
sponsibility for care-taking, are affected in their working lives by their care-taking role
to a much greater degree than men.  Thus, “employment standards that apply to one
gender only have serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against
employees and applicants for employment who are of that gender.” Id. § 2601(a)(6).
21. See id. § 2601(a)(4).
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (4)(a)(iii)(2003).  Section 2611 states that an “employer”
for FMLA purposes includes any “public agency” as defined within the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act.  The Fair Labor Standards Act defines “public agency” as “the Government
of the United States; the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any
agency of the United States (including the United States postal service and Postal Rate
Commission), a State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmen-
tal agency.”  Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2003).
23. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(a)(i).
24. See id. § 2611(2)(a)(i).
25. See id. § 2611(2)(a)(ii).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(2003).  States, as well as employers, are free to pro-
vide more generous leave policies than that mandated by the FMLA.  For instance, on
September 23, 2002, California passed a leave policy providing for up to six weeks of
partially paid leave each year for certain employees. See Family Temporary Disability
Insurance Act (FTDI), 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 901 (S.B. 1661).  Notably, the FTDI
extends coverage to employees who need time off to care for the serious health condi-
tion of a domestic partner or to bond with the child of a domestic partner. See Natalie
Koss, Current Event: The California Family Temporary Disability Insurance Program, 11 Am.
U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1079 (2003) (arguing that the FTDI may foster workplace
productivity, assist low-income families, and result in financial savings for employers as
well as the state of California).  Further, the FTDI, unlike the FMLA, covers employers
with less than fifty employees. See id at 1084.  See also K. Nicole Harms, Caring for Mom
and Dad: The Importance of Family-Provided Eldercare and the Positive Implications of Califor-
nia’s Paid Family Leave Act, 10 Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L. 69 (2003)(arguing that
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year for the birth,28 adoption, or placement of a child in foster
care29 or to care for a child, parent,30 or spouse31 with a “serious
health condition.”32  An employee may also take leave to care for
her own “serious health condition.”33  At the close of the leave, an
employee is entitled to reinstatement to the position she held prior
to leaving34 or to an equivalent position with equivalent benefits
and pay.35  This right to reinstatement, however, is not absolute;
under section 2614(a)(3), an employee “is not entitled to any right,
benefit, or position of employment other than any right, benefit, or
position to which [she] would have been entitled had [she] not
taken the leave.”36  The legislative history of the FMLA notes that
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c).  The Act notes that employers who provide paid leave
at a number of weeks less than twelve need not provide compensation for any addi-
tional weeks. See id. § 2612(d)(1).  Eligible employees may also elect, or an employer
may require the employee, to substitute any paid vacation, personal, or family leave for
any part of the twelve weeks entitled under the FMLA.  See id. § 2612(d)(2).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(a)(2003).  The Act restricts entitlement under this
subsection by requiring the employee to take leave within twelve months of the date of
the birth of a child. Id. § 2612(a)(2).
29. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(b).
30. The term “parent” is defined as the “biological parent” of an employee or a
person who stood “in loco parentis” to the employee when he or she was younger. See 29
U.S.C. § 2611(7)(2003).
31. The term “spouse” is defined as a “husband or wife,” and thus does not em-
brace domestic partners or cohabiting individuals of either the same-sex or opposite
sex. Id. § 2611(13).
32. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(c).
33. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(d).  Although the Act defines a “serious health condition” as
an “illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition” involving inpatient
care or “continuing treatment by a health care worker,” id. § 2611(11), the question of
what a “serious health condition” is has generated some litigation. See, e.g., Miller v.
AT&T Corp., 250 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 2002)(The flu is not a serious health condition);
Goodwin v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 15 F.Supp.2d 1197 (M.D. Ala. 1998)(poison ivy
not a serious health condition); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corp., 74 F.3d 91 (5th Cir.
1996)(food poisoning is not a serious health condition); Bauer v. Dayton-Walther
Corp., 910 F.Supp.306 (E.D. Ky. 1996)(rectal bleeding not a serious health condition);
Brannon v. Oshkosh B’Gosh, 897 F.Supp.1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)(gastroenteritis and
upper respiratory infection not serious health conditions in the absence of proof that
the conditions lasted more than three days).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1)(A)(2003).
35. Id. § 2614(a)(1)(B).
36. Id. § 2614(a)(3)(B).  Much of the confusion regarding proof allocation in re-
instatement cases can be attributed to section 2614 (a)(3), which places a limitation on
the substantive rights of employees under the FMLA.  In determining how burdens of
proof should be allocated in reinstatement cases, we are, more specifically, asking
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these substantive entitlements are “based on the same principle as
the child labor laws, the minimum wage, the Social Security, the
safety and health laws, the pension and welfare benefit laws, and
other labor laws that establish minimum standards for
employment.”37
The Act creates two distinct causes of action under which an
aggrieved employee may seek redress.  The first type of claim,
known as an “interference” or “reinstatement” claim, is the one at
issue in this discussion.  It prohibits an employer from “interfering
with, restraining, or denying” the exercise of any right under the
FMLA,38 and usually covers situations where an employee is dis-
charged while on leave or shortly upon returning from a leave.39
Interference claims, theoretically, do not depend on an employer’s
intent, as do claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
right to reinstatement (as in Rice), or the employer should prove that her right to rein-
statement was limited by the fact that she was going to be terminated anyway (as in
Smith).  The alternative Bachelder approach asks an entirely different question - whether
or not the leave constituted a “negative factor” in the employment decision.
37. S. Rep. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3, 6-7.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1)(2003).
39. See generally, e.g., Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 234 F.Supp.2d 478
(D.N.J. 2002) (suit brought under an interference theory when plaintiff’s position elim-
inated while on leave); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 298 F.3d 955 (10th Cir.
2002) (suit brought under an interference theory when plaintiff fired during her
leave).  An employee who has been discharged while on leave or shortly after a leave
may also allege that her discharge was in violation of section 2615(a)(2), the “opposi-
tion” clause of the FMLA. Although the “opposition” clause, when literally read, only
provides a cause of action when the employee is terminated for “opposing” FMLA prac-
tices or “discriminating” against employees involved in FMLA proceedings, some courts
have permitted reinstatement claims to be brought under this section when no “opposi-
tion” or FMLA proceedings were involved. See King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166
F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1999) (where the plaintiff’s case proceeded under a retaliation
theory when there was no “opposition” to FMLA practices or participation in FMLA
proceedings); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160 (1st Cir. 1998)
(reading a “discrimination theory” into the terms of section 2615 (a)(1)). But see Bach-
elder, 258 F.3d at 1124, noting that “in the case before us and in similar cases, the issue
is one of interference with the exercise of FMLA rights under section 2615(a)(1), not
retaliation or discrimination. . .[b]y their plain meaning, anti-retaliation or anti-discrim-
ination provisions do not cover visiting negative consequences on an employee simply
because he has used FMLA leave.” Id. See also Mann v. Mass. Correa Electric, No. 00
Civ. 3559, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949 at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2002) (noting that “courts
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of 1964;40 rather, they are based on whether an employer recog-
nized or denied a qualified employee’s substantive FMLA rights, in-
cluding the right to reinstatement.41
The second type of claim, colloquially termed an “anti-retalia-
tion” or “anti-discrimination” claim, prohibits an employer from
discharging or discriminating against an employee for “opposing
any practice made unlawful by the [FMLA],” or discharging or dis-
criminating against an employee for instituting or participating in
any FMLA-related proceeding.42  These latter claims, unlike inter-
ference claims, require a showing of discriminatory intent.43
III. CONFUSION IS ENGENDERED AMONGST THE CIRCUIT COURTS
Federal courts have encountered difficulties formulating evi-
dentiary schemes for reinstatement claims under the FMLA.44  At
the crux of the perplexity are two administrative regulations
40. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) 1-17 (2003).  Gener-
ally, Title VII prohibits an employer from failing to hire, refusing to hire, discharging,
or discriminating against any individual on account of his or her “race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” Id. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1).
41. See, e.g., Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir.
1997)(noting that claims under the FMLA “do not depend on discrimination” in the
absence of any “opposition” under § 2615(a)(2)); King v. Preferred Technical Group,
166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1998) (“When an employee alleges a deprivation of these
substantive guarantees . . . the intent of the employer is immaterial”); Hodgens v. Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In such cases [2615(a)(1)
cases], the employer’s subjective intent is not relevant”).
42. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2)-(b) (2003).  Specifically, § 2615 (a)(2) prohibits
an employer from discharging or discriminating against “any individual for opposing
any practice made unlawful by this title,” and section 2615(b) prohibits discriminating
against any individual because that individual has:
(1) “[F]iled a charge or has instituted or caused to be instituted any pro-
ceeding under [the FMLA];”
(2) “[G]iven, or is about to give, any information in connection with any
inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under [the
FMLA];” or
(3) “[T]estified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating
to any right under [the FMLA].”
43. See Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997); King v.
Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 1998); Hodgens v. General Dynam-
ics Corp., 144 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 1998); Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316
(5th Cir. 1999).
44. See generally, e.g., Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.
2001); Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Diffee Ford-
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promulgated by the Department of Labor (DOL) to implement the
Act.45  They are DOL regulations 825.21646 and 825.220.47  Courts
have used them invariably to justify a given proof structure.48
Regulation 825.216 states: “An employee has no greater right
to reinstatement or to other benefits and conditions of employment
than if the employee had been continuously employed during the
FMLA leave period. An employer must be able to show that an employee
would not otherwise have been employed at the time reinstatement is re-
quested in order to deny restoration to employment. For example . . . an
employer would have the burden of proving that an employee would
have been laid off during the FMLA leave period and, therefore,
not be entitled to restoration.”49
Regulation 825.220 states: “An employer is prohibited from dis-
criminating against employees or prospective employees who have
used FMLA leave . . . By the same token, employers cannot use the
taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions,
such as hiring, promotions, or disciplinary actions.”50
A second source of perplexity derives from the language of the
Act itself.  Although sections 2615(a)(2) and 2615(b) of the Act
prohibit an employer from discriminating against employees for
opposing the denial of FMLA rights and participating in FMLA-re-
lated proceedings,51 those sections do not expressly prohibit em-
ployers from discriminating against employees for merely availing
themselves of FMLA entitlements.52  Likewise, section 2615(a)(1),
the “interference” provision of the Act,53 does not expressly support
a cause of action for discrimination on account of one’s taking
45. See 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2003)(granting the power to enact regulations to the
Department of Labor).
46. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (a)(1)(2003).
47. Id. § 825.220(c)(2003).
48. See generally, Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1122 (9th Cir.
2001) (relying on DOL regulation 825.220(c)); Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008,
1018 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on DOL regulation 825.216 (a)(1)); O’Connor v. PCA
Family Health Plan, 200 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2000)(relying on DOL regulation
825.216 (a)(1), but reaching a different conclusion than that reached by the court in
Rice).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (a)(1).
50. Id. § 825.220(c).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(2)-(b) (2003).
52. See id.
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leave.54  In other words, Congress left a statutory “gap” which, if
taken literally, would preclude an entire category of discriminatory
situations from violating the Act.55  It is further unclear whether
regulation 825.220, which prohibits “discriminating against employ-
ees . . . who have used FMLA leave,” was intended by the DOL to
broaden the scope of section 2615(a)(1) or sections 2615(a)(2)
and 2615(b).56  Consequently, courts often struggle in determining
how to statutorily classify FMLA claims.
A final source of the confusion is the strange nature of the
reinstatement claim itself.  Under the FMLA, reinstatement is a sub-
stantive, prescriptive right, the violation of which does not depend
on an employer’s discriminatory motive.57  Yet situations where an
employer interferes with an employee’s substantive right to rein-
statement by denying it often do involve subtle questions of mo-
tive.58  Reinstatement also differs from many statutory rights in that
the right is not absolute, but limited by section 2614(a)(3) to situa-
54. See id.
55. See Hodgens v. General Dynamic Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 160 (1st Cir. 1998) (not-
ing that “The statute itself does not explicitly make it unlawful to discharge or discrimi-
nate against an employee for exercising her rights under the Act (such as placing an
employee in a less desirable job because she took a medical leave for a serious health
condition”).
56. Several courts have construed regulation 825.220(c) as remedying the gap left
by Congress. See Hodgens, 144 F.3d 151, 160.  The Hodgens court, recognizing the statu-
tory loophole, found that: “Nevertheless, the Act was clearly intended to provide such
protection.  The Department of Labor regulations implementing the FMLA interpret
the Act this way, see 29 U.S.C. § 825.220(c) . . . such protection can be read into section
2515(a)(1)”). See also Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1124-25 (9th
Cir. 2001).  The Bachelder court noted that although regulation 825.220(c) “refers to
‘discrimination’, [it] actually pertains to the ‘interference with the exercise of rights’
section of the statute, section 2615 (a)(1), not the anti-retaliation or anti-discrimination
sections, 2615 (a)(2) and 2615(b).” But see Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 234
F.Supp. 2d 478, 487-88 (D.N.J. 2002)(citing regulation 825.220(c) in reference to sec-
tions 2615 (a)(2)-(b) of the Act, as opposed to the “interference” provision of the Act).
57. See, e.g., Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997); King
v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887 (7th Cir.1998); Hodgens, 144 F.3d 151 (1st
Cir. 1998); Bachelder, 259 F.3d 1112; Smith, 298 F.3d 955.
58. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1008 (where the plaintiff was told by a supervisor that she
was being terminated because she was “already off”).  Due to the fact that reinstatement
claims sometimes do involve both the denial of a prescriptive right as well as discrimina-
tory intent, plaintiffs often plead both “interference” and “retaliation” claims in the
alternative.  Further, since judicial confusion exists on how to statutorily categorize cer-
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tions where an employee would still be in her master’s employ had
she not taken a leave.59
Misinterpretation of DOL regulation 825.216 and the nature
of the interference claim has led the Seventh Circuit to apply an
evidentiary framework crafted for employment discrimination suits
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)60 to inter-
ference claims.61  This approach is flawed primarily because it does
not afford due deference to DOL regulation 825.216, the regula-
tion the DOL intended to govern burden allocation.  Also, interfer-
ence claims under the FMLA do not depend on motive62 (as do
disparate impact cases under Title VII), and the McDonnell Douglas
framework, even in its original Title VII context, has several faults.63
The Ninth Circuit, attempting to quell some of the confusion
surrounding reinstatement claims, adopted a “negative factor”
test64 (drawn from regulation 820.220) that has garnered support
from at least one other circuit, as well as one foreign district
court.65  The strength of the Bachelder approach, which asks
whether an employer “attached negative consequences”66 to the en-
joyment of FMLA rights, is that it accounts for the role of intent
59. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(3).
60. Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) 1-17 (2003).
61. See Rice, 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir.2000); Kohl’s v. Beverly Enterprises Wisconsin,
Inc., 259 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2001).
62. Please note the careful use of the term “depend” regarding the relationship
between intent and prescriptive FMLA rights and the use of the term “require” in
describing the relation of intent to proscriptive FMLA claims.  Although prescriptive
rights do not depend on motive, motive sometimes enters the picture, depending on
the factual situation at hand.
63. See infra notes 110-19 and the accompanying text.
64. See Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001).
65. See Mann v. Mass Correa Electric, No. 00 Civ. 3559, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2002)(implicitly adopting the standard enunciated in Bachelder by
citing it heavily and employing a substantially similar test); Brenlla v. LaSorsa Buick
Pontiac Chevrolet, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5207, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9358 (S.D.N.Y. May 28,
2002)(declining to decide if McDonnell Douglas applies or the Bachelder/Mann test ap-
plied because the plaintiff met her evidentiary burden under “the more rigorous Mc-
Donnell Douglas analysis”); Pharakhone v. Nissan North America, 324 F.3d 405, 408 (6th
Cir. 2003) (declining to adopt an evidentiary approach but noting that “if an employee
cannot show that he was discharged because he took leave – or at least that his taking of
leave was a ‘negative factor’ in the employer’s decision to terminate him – he cannot
show a violation of the FMLA”).
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without requiring the parties to walk through the “thicket”67 of Mc-
Donnell-Douglas.  Further, the Ninth Circuit’s approach provides an
unambiguous framework for statutorily classifying FMLA claims as
falling under either section 2615(a)(1) or section 2615(a)(2)-(b).
However, this approach, like the Rice approach, does not pay defer-
ence to DOL regulation 825.220, the regulation the DOL intended
to govern burdens of proof in reinstatement cases, and ignores the
precise issue posed by a reinstatement claim: whether the right to
reinstatement existed.68
A. Applying Anti-Discrimination Law to Non-Motive Based Claims and
Ignoring the Principle of Chevron Deference:
Rice v. Sunrise Express
Sandra Rice was employed as a payroll-billing clerk for Sunrise
Express, a trucking company, when she took a medical leave to un-
dergo surgery.69  Four days prior to Ms. Rice’s scheduled return,
Sunrise terminated her, citing layoffs due to a “decrease in freight”
and the ability of the other clerks to perform the work in her
absence.70
In a marked break from established Seventh Circuit prece-
dent,71 the Rice court held, over a sharp dissent,72 that an employee
alleging a violation of the prescriptive right to reinstatement must
always bear the burden of proving that she would not have been
terminated had she not taken a leave.73  The Rice court began its
analysis by noting that section 2614(a)(3) of the Act, which limits
an employee’s rights to those she would have been entitled to had
67. Fesce v. Guardsman Elevator Co., No. 96 Civ. 6793, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3878 at *23 (S.D.N.Y. March 26, 1998).
68. See supra note 36.
69. Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1010-11 (7th Cir. 2000).
70. Id. at 1011.
71. See Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997), (foreclos-
ing the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework for FMLA claims brought under the
substantive protection of 2615 (a)(1)); King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d
887 (7th Cir. 1999) (reaffirming the holding in Diaz). See also Murphy, Michael L.,
Note, The Federal Courts’ Struggle With Burden Allocation for Reinstatement Claims Under the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 50 CATH. U.L. Rev. 1081 (2001), providing an in depth
look at the progression of the erosion of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Diaz as well as
the overall inadequacies of the Rice approach.
72. See Rice, 209 F.3d 1008 at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
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she not taken a leave,74 limits an employee’s substantive rights for
purposes of section 2615(a)(1).75  The inevitable consequence of
this, the court reasoned, is that the plaintiff must always bear the
ultimate burden of proving to the court that the benefit is one fall-
ing under section 2615(a)(1), and that the employee would have
received such benefit had she not taken the leave.76  The employer
may, if he wishes, produce evidence to the contrary, but the em-
ployer’s burden is only one of production, not persuasion.77  In
other words, the employee, to surmount loss at the summary judg-
ment phase, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that,
had she not taken the leave, she would not have been terminated
for low work productivity or tardiness.  The employee must prove a
negative.
The Rice court construed Department of Labor regulation
825.216 as not interpretive of congressional intent regarding bur-
den allocation, but merely as an “explanation of the nature of the
substantive right created by the statute.”78  Regulation 825.220 was
not addressed at all in the opinion.  The court also failed to deline-
ate the range of situations that could constitute “interference with
rights,” ignoring the statutory loophole left by section 2615 of the
Act.
The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the lower court for
reconsideration, finding the evidence unclear as to whether the “in-
struction misallocating the burden of proof [made] a difference in
the final outcome of the case.”79
1. The Fallacy of Rice v. Sunrise Express
There are two main problems with the majority’s approach in
Rice.  First, the Rice majority disregarded the well-established princi-





78. Rice, 209 F.3d at 1018. By the terms “explanation of the nature of the substan-
tive right created by the statute,” the Court refers to the “limitation” imposed on the
employee’s right to reinstatement as per section 2614(a)(3), which limits an employee’s
reinstatement rights in situations where the employee would have been terminated or
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statute80 by imposing its own contorted meaning to the clear lan-
guage of DOL regulation 825.216.  Second, it applied the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework, a paradigm designed for intent-
based claims,81 to FMLA claims that do not depend on motive.82  A
corollary problem to this is that the utility of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, even in its original Title VII context, is questionable.83
The Supreme Court carefully examined the duty of courts to
defer to reasonable agency regulations in the case of Chevron U.S.A,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,84 where they reversed a
lower court’s act of setting aside a regulation promulgated by the
Environmental Protection Agency.85  According to the Court, when
a lower court is faced with an agency regulation, it must first look to
the legislative history of the Act and the Act itself to see if Congress
has directly spoken on the issue.86  If Congress has spoken, then the
court (as well as the agency) must give effect to the congressional
intent.87  When Congressional intent is unclear or silent on a partic-
ular issue, a court may not “impose its own construction on the stat-
ute,”88 but must instead determine whether the agency’s
interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the stat-
80. See, e.g., Chevron v. U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998); Thorson v. Gemini Inc.,
205 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2000).
81. See infra notes 97-01 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
84. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
85. Id. at 866.
86. Id. at 842. Specifically, the court stated that:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of a statute which it adminis-
ters, it is confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed in-
tent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. Id.
87. Id. at 842-43.
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ute”89 and is “reasonable.”90  However, a court is not required to
pay deference to an agency regulation if it is “arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”91
The Rice court, in essence, disregarded the rule of Chevron.  Al-
though the court was correct in its determination that section
2614(a)(3) places a limitation on an employee’s right to reinstate-
ment,92 it summarily concluded that this subsection indicated Con-
gressional intent to place upon the employee the burden of
proving that she would have been entitled to reinstatement had she
not taken a leave.93  The court then imputed this meaning to regu-
lation 825.216, construing the regulation as merely explaining the
limited “nature of the substantive right” to reinstatement.94  Despite
Chevron’s progeny, the court did not analyze the regulation to deter-
mine if it was based on a permissible construction of the FMLA.95
Further, a plain reading of the regulation, which contains the terms
“an employer would have the burden of proving,” points to a con-
clusion opposite to that reached by the Rice court.96
As the dissenting opinion pointed out, the majority employed
an evidentiary paradigm crafted for intent–based Title VII disparate
treatment suits known as the McDonnell Douglas burden–shifting
framework.97  Under McDonnell Douglas, which is employed only
89. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The Court notes, however, that a tribunal “need not
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Id.
90. Id. at 844.
91. Id.  See also Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v.
Francis, 432 U.S. 424, 426 (1977); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. United
States, 299 U.S. 232, 236 (1936).
92. See, e.g., Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hospital, 234 F.Supp.2d 478, 485-86
(D.N.J. 2002); Kohls v. Beverly Enterprises Wisconsin, 259 F.3d 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2001).
93. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000).
94. Id.
95. See Rice, 209 F.3d 1008.  The majority opinion never even mentioned the
Chevron principle of deference to agency regulations.
96. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1).  Using a textual method of statutory construc-
tion, the terms “an employer would have the burden of proving,” clearly point to the
employer bearing the ultimate burden of proof on the issue.
97. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J. dissenting).  Justice Evans commented:
“[W]e have said, in a way that can hardly be misunderstood, that we disapprove of a
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach in FMLA cases not involving discrimina-
tion. Nevertheless, I think the majority here has allowed a McDonnell Douglas style analy-
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when direct evidence of discrimination is wanting,98 a plaintiff must
carry the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of employ-
ment discrimination.99  Once established, the burden then shifts to
the employer to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose
for taking an adverse employment action.100  Finally, the burden
shifts back to the employee to ultimately persuade the court that
the adverse action was the result of unlawful discrimination, and
earlier decision in Diaz, which foreclosed the use of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in
cases alleging a violation of a prescriptive FMLA right. See Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry
Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-13 (7th Cir. 1997).
98. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  In discrimination
cases where direct evidence of discrimination exists, courts employ the framework
enunciated in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  In Price Waterhouse,
the plaintiff was denied a promotion.  Various “questionnaires” regarding her compe-
tency for promotion indicated that sex stereotypes had entered the deliberation pro-
cess.  Under Price Waterhouse, a plaintiff must first show that discrimination was a
“motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision.  Once this has been shown, the
plaintiff prevails.  However, the employer may then affirmatively defend himself by
showing that, absent the illicit consideration of sex, the same employment decision
would have been made. Id.
99. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802.  The prima facie case in Title VII
terms consists of a showing that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected class (2) the
plaintiff applied for a job for which the plaintiff was qualified, and the employer was
seeking applicants for the job in question (3) the plaintiff was rejected, and (4) the
position stayed open, and the employer continued to seek applicants with the same
qualifications as the plaintiff. Id.  The purpose of the prima facie case is to eliminate
“the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection.”  When the
prima facie case is established, a presumption arises that the defendant-employer inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff-employee. Texas Dept. of Comty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
100. Id. In Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court clarified the nature of
the employer’s burden at the intermediate phase of the McDonnell Douglas test.  The
court rejected the contention that a defendant-employer need prove to the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that an adverse employment decision was made for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.  Instead, the employer need only offer a legitimate
reason for his decision – the employer’s burden is one of burden of production, not of
persuasion.  If the employer meets this burden of production, the presumption created
by the establishment of the prima facie case is rebutted, leaving the final burden of
persuading the court that the employer’s proffered reason was pre-textual, and that
unlawful discrimination was the true reason for the employment action at issue.  On the
other hand, if the employer fails to produce a legitimate reason for his employment
decision, the presumption created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case has not been rebut-
ted, and the plaintiff prevails. Id. at 254-55.  If the finder of fact rejects the defendant-
employer’s proffered explanation, such disbelief, combined with the plaintiff’s prima
facie case, may “suffice to show intentional discrimination.”  St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
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the reason offered by the employer was merely a pretext for such
discrimination.101
The Seventh Circuit employed a variant of this approach to
suits based on prescriptive FMLA rights by placing upon the em-
ployer a mere burden of production to offer, not prove, a legiti-
mate reason for terminating the employee.102  As in McDonnell
Douglas, the ultimate burden of proof shifted to the plaintiff to
prove that the employer’s stated reasons were insufficient or un-
founded, and that the employee would not have been discharged,
or his position would not have been eliminated, had he not taken
FMLA leave.103
Although several circuits have held,104 or have left open the
possibility,105 that a McDonnell Douglas burden- shifting framework
is applicable to claims brought under the “opposition” clauses of
the FMLA, sections 2615(a)(2)&(b), several circuits have foreclosed
its application to alleged violations of prescriptive entitlements
under section 2615(a)(1).106  The reason for this is that rights af-
forded under section 2615(a)(1) do not, in theory, depend on an
employer’s discriminatory motive.  For instance, a man filing suit
101. See Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256.  “The plaintiff retains the burden of persua-
sion.  She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was
not the true reason for the employment decision.  This burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination.” Id.
102. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000).
103. See id.
104. See generally Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hospital, 234 F.Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J.
2002) (holding that McDonnell Douglas applies to plaintiff’s proscriptive FMLA claim
and the approach outlined in Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 298 F.3d 955, ap-
plies to the plaintiff’s prescriptive FMLA claim); Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d
at 319 (5th Cir. 1999), (finding that the plaintiff “is asserting a violation of a proscrip-
tive duty” and therefore, her claim “should be analyzed under the framework estab-
lished in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green”); King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166
F.3d at 892 (7th Cir. 1999)(holding that “in the absence of direct evidence of discrimi-
nation, we will apply the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework to claims that
an employer discriminated against an employee exercising rights guaranteed by the
FMLA”).
105. See Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001) (de-
clining to decide “[w]hether or not the McDonnell Douglas anti-discrimination approach
is applicable in cases involving the “anti-retaliation” provisions of [the] FMLA).
106. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125 (9th Cir. 2001); Smith, 298 F.3d at 955 (10th
Cir. 2002); Parker, 234 F.Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J. 2002); Hodges v. General Dynamics
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under the FMLA alleging that his employer failed to grant him a
leave to tend to the adoption of his infant son does not have to
show that his employer permitted all of the women in his office to
take a leave; the question is instead whether or not his employer
recognized his FMLA right, if any existed, to take the tweleve weeks
of leave.107  The employer’s distaste for men who assume “women’s
work” may have entered the equation when the employer made his
decision, but the employer’s intent is not relevant to the ultimate
issue of whether the right existed.  In a Title VII disparate treat-
ment case, on the other hand, the plaintiff would have to show that
his employer treated him, as a member of a protected class, less
favorably than employees of a different class.108  By applying McDon-
nell Douglas to the plaintiff’s entitlement claim, the Rice court effec-
tively destroyed the pivotal distinction between section 2615(a)(1)
interference claims and 2615(a)(2)-(b) retaliation claims.  This fu-
sion of the two distinct claims explains why the Rice court failed to
address the statutory loophole of section 2615.109
Finally, as the Rice dissent hinted,110 the utility of the McDonnell
Douglas framework in any context is questionable.111  Although the
Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the test is to “sharpen
107. This hypothetical is drawn from language in Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159.  The
court states: “as to these [substantive] rights, therefore, the employee need not show
that the employer treated other employees less favorably, and an employer may not
defend its interference with the FMLA’s substantive rights on the ground that it treats
all employees equally poorly without discriminating”. Id.
108. See generally, e.g., Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160; Parker, 234 F.Supp.2d at 488; King,
166 F.3d at 892-93; McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792.
109. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).  The court does not
examine the scope of “interference” with FMLA rights, nor does it distinguish between
cases where an employee was denied a right, such as reinstatement, with cases where an
employee alleges that she was discriminated against (via, e.g., demotion or discharge)
for availing herself of her FMLA rights.
110. See Rice, 209 F.3d at 1019 (Evans, J., dissenting).
111. See, e.g., Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Employment Discrimination: Moving Beyond
McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64
Brooklyn L. Rev. 659 (1998)(criticizing McDonnell Douglas and advocating a simplified,
three part approach). See also Steven W. Smith, Title VII’s National Anthem: Is There a
Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case?, 12 Lab. Law. 371 (1997); Deborah C. Malamud,
The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 2229 (1995); Kenneth
R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 61 Brook. L. Rev. 703 (1995). But see William Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and
Throwing Out Proof Structures: It is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 Empl. Rts. &
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the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimi-
nation,”112 critics have pointed out that the test often serves to ob-
fuscate the real issue in employment litigation - whether or not the
employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff - by shift-
ing the court’s focus from the evidence as a whole to the weight of
the evidence at each individual phase of the test.113  Furthermore,
assessing the weight of the evidence at several different points in
one “test” unduly taxes courts, since there is really only one issue,
and thus only two sets of proof (one from the employee and one
from the employer) to be examined.114  Several district court
judges, recognizing these inherent weaknesses to McDonnell Doug-
las, now summarily dispense with the first two steps of the test by
assuming that a prima facie case has been established by the plain-
tiff and merely noting the legitimate reasons asserted by the defen-
dant-employer.115  In essence, the test is not viewed as a useful
instrument for fact-finding, but a formality in employment discrimi-
nation litigation.
Another general criticism of the test is that it places an unfairly
onerous burden on an employee-plaintiff by requiring her to prove
a negative in the final stage of the test (e.g., that the reason offered
by the employer is pre-textual and that discrimination was the real
reason for the adverse decision; or, in the FMLA context, that, had
the plaintiff not taken leave, she would not have been terminated
112. Texas Dept. of Comty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, n.8 (1981).
113. See Chin & Golinsky, supra note 111, at 669.  Chin & Golinsky note that McDon-
nell Douglas “requires a court to engage in a cumbersome seven-step analysis – four
elements in prong one, one element for prong two – and two elements for prong three.
Successful application of the prongs not only requires the court to navigate through
seven distinct steps of inquiry, but it requires the court to assess the evidence in the case
three separate times.” Id.
114. Id. at 671.
115. Chin & Golinsky, supra note 111, noted several decisions from Second Circuit
District Courts where the court merely presumed that a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion had been established. See, e.g., Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 992 F. Supp 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Ctrs., Inc., 982 F.Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Santiago v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); Coleman
v. Runyon, 898 F.Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp.,
131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997) (“District courts regularly treat the prima facie case as a
throwaway—holding discovery before deciding whether the plaintiff has satisfied the
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from her position).116  The difficulty in proving negatives in the
employment context is succinctly pointed out by Professor Corne-
lius J. Peck,117 in his law review article criticizing a Washington
court’s placement of the burden of proof in a wrongful discharge
case on an employee to prove the absence of just cause to termi-
nate:118  “For example, how can an employee demonstrate that tar-
diness or absence from work did not interfere with operations, that
he never reported for work under the influence of alcohol or a con-
trolled substance, that he never fell asleep while at work, that he
was not the one who damaged a piece of equipment, or that his
spoilage rate did not exceed that of other employees?”119
116. See text accompanying notes 97-101.
117. Cornelius J. Peck is a Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Washing-
ton School of Law.
118. See Peck, Cornelius J., Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Law of
Wrongful Discharge, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 719 (1991).  The action of wrongful discharge
emerged from the erosion of the at will employment rule, which generally permitted an
employer to fire an employee for no cause at any time.  Wrongful discharge may arise
via tort, known as the public policy exception to the at will employment rule. See
Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959) (invalidating the ter-
mination of an employee fired for refusing to commit perjury at the instruction of his
employer); Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (permitting the tort of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when such public policy is reflected in a
constitutional or statutory source). But see Murphy v. American Home Products, 448
N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983)(declining to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge).
Wrongful discharge may also arise via breaches of terms of employee handbooks, writ-
ten contracts, or even via the implied terms of an oral contract. See Woolley v. Hoff-
mann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985) (holding that promises contained in
employee handbooks may contractually bind an employer); Gordon v. Matthew Bender
& Co., 562 F.Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(objective standards contained within written
employment contracts may give rise to an action for wrongful discharge); Pugh v. See’s
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 (Cal. App. 1981)(cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge may lie when facts indicate an implied promise that the employment relation-
ship was to continue in duration).
119. See Peck, supra note 118, at n.257.  Peck states:
The Washington court’s explanation of why the plaintiff must bear the bur-
den of proof in a case alleging wrongful discharge is unsatisfactory. In a
disparate treatment case under Title VII or state law, the plaintiff contends
that the cause of the discharge was a factor, such as race or sex. Such a
discharge is prohibited by the applicable statute. The plaintiff makes an
affirmative allegation and normally the burden of proof is placed on a party
asserting the affirmative. In a wrongful discharge case it is the employer
that alleges the affirmative — that there was cause for discharge. To place
the burden of proof on the employee requires the employee to undertake
what is frequently impossible, that is to prove a negative. Another factor
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In sum, the McDonnell Douglas–type scheme adopted by the
Rice court for adjudicating prescriptive reinstatement claims is the
least desirable because it ignores the authority of the DOL to pro-
mulgate regulations based on reasonable interpretations of con-
gressional intent.  Further, it obfuscates the distinction between
interference and retaliation claims by applying a faltering frame-
work designed for motive-based claims to claims that can arise
independent of employer motive.
B. Lessening the Plaintiff’s Burden But Deferring to the Wrong DOL
Regulation: Bachelder v. America West Airlines
Penny Bachelder was terminated from her position as a cus-
tomer service representative at America West Airlines following six-
teen work absences in three months.120  America West cited the
absences as a ground for dismissal in its’ termination letter, errone-
ously believing that the sixteen absences were not covered by
the Act.121  Bachelder filed suit, alleging that America West illicitly
The employer is the party who took the action and ought to be in the posi-
tion to establish why it took that action. Moreover, employers generally
maintain elaborate personnel records; employees do not. For these reasons
the consistent practice of arbitrators who make determinations of just cause
under collective bargaining agreements is to place the burden of proof on
employers.
Id.
Although Professor Peck’s analysis is confined to the placement of the burden of proof
on an employee to prove the absence of just cause to terminate in a wrongful discharge
action, his reasoning can be extended to FMLA reinstatement claims, where the ulti-
mate question is whether the employee would have been terminated had she not taken
a leave.  As in a “just cause” suit, the employer should be charged with proving the
affirmative – that the plaintiff would have been terminated irrespective of her taking an
FMLA leave.
120. Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2001).
121. Id at 1121. This case is better known for its decision regarding methods of
calculating the twelve month “leave year” that establishes one criterion of an FMLA
employee’s entitlement to leave. Under the “leave year” regulation, an employer may
choose from one of four methods to calculate an FMLA “leave year.” See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.200 (2003).  The employer must apply the method chosen uniformly to all em-
ployees. See id. § 825.220(d)(1).  If the employer fails to select a method, the method
with the most beneficial outcome to the employee will be used. See id. § 825.220(e).  In
Bachelder, the employer posted general materials regarding the FMLA & distributed an
employee handbook, but never expressly informed his employees of the selected calcu-
lating method. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d 1126.  The court construed regulation 825.301,
which requires employers who provide “any written guidance to employees concerning
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considered her use of FMLA leave in its decision to terminate
her.122
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit established a novel approach to
the adjudication of interference claims under the FMLA and di-
rectly addressed the characterization of claims issue.123  After sur-
veying the Act’s legislative history and parsing the statutory
language, the court drew an analogy between the FMLA and the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).124  The NLRA, like the
FMLA, guarantees employees several substantive rights.125  Section
157 of the NLRA affords employees the right to “self-organiz[e],
form, join, or assist labor organizations” and, conversely, to refrain
from engaging in union-related activities.126  These provisions, the
court reasoned, are comparable to the leave and reinstatement en-
titlements afforded by section 2614 of the FMLA.127  Further, sec-
tion 158(a)(1) of the NLRA, like section 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA,
creates a cause of action for “interfering” with the substantive rights
of covered employees.128  From this premise, the court concluded
that “interference” for FMLA purposes should mirror “interfer-
ence” for NLRA purposes.129  The court went on to cite employer
actions held to constitute interference with NLRA rights,130 such as
distributing literature hinting of job losses should employees form a
[FMLA] policies” therein”, as instilling a duty on behalf of employers to inform employ-
ees of the selected calculating method.  Since Bachelder was not informed of the
method, the court calculated her leave year under the method most beneficial to her,
which led to a finding that several absences believed to be outside of the Act were
indeed covered by it. Id. at 1127-1130. The court rejected the employer’s argument
that he acted “in good faith,” and used the absences which America West cited as the
reason for Bachelder’s discharge as a basis for concluding that America West had “inter-
fered with” the plaintiff’s right to reinstatement. Id. at 1130, 1132.
122. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1121.
123. I have not discovered any case law prior to this decision that utilizes a “nega-
tive factor” test drawn from the Department of Labor regulations.
124. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d 1112, 1123-25.
125. See id. at 1123.
126. Id. (quoting the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2003)).
127. See id.
128. See Id.
129. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.  The court cites to Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of
the Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428, for the proposition that the “similarity of
statutory language is strong indication that statutes should be interpreted in the same
manner.”
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union,131 or spying on union meetings.132  This is comparable, in
FMLA terms, to a situation where an employer verbally discourages
an employee from taking a leave by reminding her of upcoming
promotions and the possibility of her being “overlooked.”  Thus,
under both the NLRA and the FMLA, employer actions that “attach
negative consequences”133 (i.e., reprimand or dismissal) to the ex-
ercise of protected rights and “tends to chill”134 participation in
protected activities constitute “interference” or “restraint” with an
employee’s substantive rights.135
The court relied on DOL regulation 825.216, which prohibits
“discriminating against employees who have used FMLA leave,”136
as support for the proposition that “interference” extends beyond
the denial of FMLA rights or the mere failure to reinstate.137  Al-
though regulation 825.220 does not differentiate between the two
causes of action,138 the court concluded that it “pertains to the in-
terference” section of the statute.139  The court rejected America
West’s argument that McDonnell Douglas applied to Bachelder’s
claim.140  Consistent with the language of regulation 825.220, the
court held that in order for a plaintiff to prevail at the summary
judgment phase, she need only prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the activity at issue was “covered” by the Act (ex. the
employee did not exceed the twelve week allotment), and the leave
constituted a “negative factor” in the making of the adverse employ-
131. See id. (citing NLRB v. Four Winds Indus. Inc., 530 F.2d 75, 78-79 (9th Cir.
1976).
132. See id. (citing California Acrylic Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th
Cir. 1998).
133. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.  The court states: “As a general matter then . . .
employer actions that deter employees’ participation in protected activities constitute
“interference” or “restraint” with the employees’ exercise of their rights.  Employees
are, understandably, less willing to exercise their FMLA rights if they can expect to be
fired for or otherwise disciplined for doing so”. Id.
134. Id. (quoting California Acrylic Indus. Inc. v. NLRB, 150 F.3d 1095, which
noted that “employers violate [the NLRA] by engaging in activity that tends to chill an
employee’s freedom to exercise his rights.”).
135. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
136. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (c) (2003).
137. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
138. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (c)(2003).
139. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
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ment decision.141  Once this has been shown, the Act has been vio-
lated and the employer may not defend himself by demonstrating
that, absent the illicit motivation, the employee would have been
terminated for other, legitimate reasons.142  The employee may use
direct or circumstantial evidence to establish her case.143
The court ultimately reversed summary judgment in favor of
America West and granted it to Bachelder, finding that her sixteen
absences were indeed covered by the Act and therefore, improperly
considered in the decision to terminate her.144
1. The Fallacy of Bachelder v. America West Airlines
This burden formulation, which has been adopted by one
other circuit145 and at least one foreign district court,146 has several
141. See id.
142. It is not entirely clear whether the Bachelder court intended to make an affirm-
ative defense available for employers in subsequent cases.  Although the court does not
explicitly state that the employer may not defend himself by proving that the employee
would have been fired for another, legitimate purpose, the court does not announce
such an affirmative defense in its holding. Language towards the conclusion of the
opinion tends to indicate that such a defense is not available.
“Finally, America West argues that Bachelder failed to show that the other two reasons
it initially put forward for firing her — her failure to adequately administer the Em-
ployee of the Month program and her unsatisfactory on-time performance— were pre-
textual.  As we have already explained, however, there is no room for a McDonnell Doug-
las type of pretext analysis when evaluating an “interference” claim under this statute.
The question here is not whether America West had additional reasons for the dis-
charge, but whether Bachelder’s taking of the 1996 FMLA-protected leave was used as a
negative factor in her discharge.  We know that the taking of the leave for the period in
question was indeed used as a negative factor because America West so announced at
the time of the discharge and does not deny that fact now. Moreover, America West
does not seriously contend that, even though it considered an impermissible reason in
firing Bachelder, it would have fired her anyway for the two other reasons alone.  Even
if it had made such an argument, of course, the regulations clearly prohibit the use of
FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor at all.  Therefore no further inquiry on the
question whether America West violated the statute in discharging Bachelder is unnec-
essary.” Id. at 1131.
143. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1125.  This differs from a McDonnell Douglas style
approach, which is employed only when direct evidence is lacking.
144. Id. at 1132.
145. See Pharakhone v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 6289
(6th Cir. 2003).  The Sixth Circuit is the first circuit to employ the Bachelder “negative
factor” test.  The court affirmed a grant of summary judgment to the defendant-em-
ployer, noting that “to prevail on his FMLA claim, [the plaintiff] would have had to
demonstrate that his taking of leave was a ‘negative factor’ in [the defendant’s] deci-





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 112 Side B      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR303.txt unknown Seq: 24 26-APR-04 15:22
600 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
strengths.  The most promising aspect of Bachelder’s “negative fac-
tor” test is that it reconciles the theory that interference claims arise
independent of employer motive with the reality that motive often
does play a role in such claims.147  The Bachelder court did this by
couching employer motive in the interference realm as the “attach-
ment” of negative consequences to protected activity.148
Consequently, the Bachelder court also resolved some of the
confusion regarding the characterization of claims involving dis-
crimination, but no “opposition” or FMLA “proceedings” or “in-
quiries.”149 According to Bachelder, these types of claims are
included within the scope of 2615(a)(1)’s prohibition on interfer-
ing with FMLA rights.150  This guidance will likely assist attorneys in
pleading claims and facilitate the adjudication of FMLA claims in
the Ninth Circuit.
Further, Bachelder’s direct focus on the negative ramifications
of FMLA-protected activity aids the court in ascertaining what really
happened without requiring the plaintiff-employee to jump
through the hoops of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm – hoops that
are often ignored by the courts to begin with.151  Furthermore, it
drastically increases an employee’s chance for victory when com-
pared to the onerous McDonnell Douglas approach,152 which tends
146. See Sabatino v. Flik Int’l Corp., 286 F.Supp.2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Mann v.
Mass. Correa Electric, No. 00 Civ. 3559, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 949 (S.D.N.Y. January 23,
2002).
147. A troubling aspect of the Bachelder court’s “negative factor” test is that, al-
though the court states in its opinion that employer intent is immaterial in 2615(a)(1)
interference cases, assessing whether the employer “attached negative consequences” to
a leave necessarily involves some consideration of employer intent.
148. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124.
149. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
150. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124-25.
151. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
152. This is illustrated by the case of Brenlla v. Lasorsa Buick Pontiac Chevrolet, 2002
U.S. Dis. LEXIS 9358 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), where the court noted the circuit split between
courts applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to reinstatement claims and the 9th
Circuit’s “negative factor” test, but declined to take a position on the issue.  The Court
stated: “It is unnecessary to resolve the issue in this case because regardless of whether
the McDonnell Douglas framework is employed, the result is the same. . . . Because the
plaintiff satisfies the more rigorous McDonnell Douglas analysis as described below, she has also
established liability under the standard enunciated in Bachelder and Mann.” Id. at 21-24. By
“Mann,” the court refers to its earlier decision in Mann v. Mass. Correa Electric, No. 00





      04/29/2004   08:40:46
18314_nlr_48-3 Sheet No. 113 Side A      04/29/2004   08:40:46
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\48-3\NLR303.txt unknown Seq: 25 26-APR-04 15:22
2004] FAMILY LEAVE ACT 601
to quash an employee’s victory in the final stage where an employee
must prove that she would not have been fired had she not taken
leave.153
On the other hand, the Bachelder approach leaves several ques-
tions unresolved.  First, the court was not clear as to whether the
“negative factor” standard applies to all interference claims or only
those “retaliatory” interference claims where an employee alleges
that she has been discriminated against for taking a leave.  The
problem with this lack of clarity is that interference claims alleging
the denial of prescriptive rights do not depend on discriminatory
intent,154 while those alleging discrimination for availing one’s self
of FMLA rights necessarily do.155  This lack of guidance may serve
to confuse lower courts as to when and in what manner “the nega-
tive factor” test should be applied.156
Another troubling aspect of the “negative factor” test is that it
does not allow an employer the opportunity to defend himself via
an affirmative defense.157 By precluding an employer from demon-
strating that the employee would have been terminated irrespective
of her taking a leave, the proof structure ignores the precise ques-
tion that must be answered in a reinstatement suit: Did the em-
ployee’s right to reinstatement ever exist?  More specifically, was the
right to reinstatement conferred by the FMLA effectively limited by
section 2614(a)(3) due to, i.e., a reduction in force, a corporate
for the Southern District of New York implicitly adopted the Bachelder “negative factor”
standard.
153. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. However, it must be noted that,
although the Bachelder approach lessens the plaintiff’s burden when compared to the
Rice approach, it still leaves her with the ultimate burden of proof on the issue.
154. See supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
155. Motive is an indispensable element to any claim alleging discrimination. See
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) 1-17 (2003).
156. In Schmauch v. Honda of America Manufacturing, Inc., No. C2002-751, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24013 at *17 (S.D. Ohio December 11, 2003), the district court for the
Eastern district of Ohio adopted Bachelder’s preponderance of the evidence standard
over the McDonnell Douglas standard.  The court interpreted Bachelder broadly: “The
parties’ arguments about how to label [the plaintiff’s]claim are irrelevant.  Defendant’s
conduct here may be labeled as ‘discrimination, ‘retaliation’, ‘interference’, or any
other host of descriptors, but if plaintiff proves it contravened the Act or the regula-
tions, defendant will be found to have violated the FLMA, regardless of the word cho-
sen to describe [the defendant’s] actions”).
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restructuring, or the employee’s own unsatisfactory service?158
Even the Rice court’s McDonnell Douglas approach, despite its faults,
is designed to answer this critical inquiry.159  The question of
whether the employer “attached negative consequences” to a leave
is really only marginally pertinent to an action alleging violation of
a substantive right, where the employer’s mere failure to recognize
the right, is, in itself, a fact of legal consequence.160  Even assuming
that the Bachelder court intended the negative factor test to apply
only to retaliatory discharge claims under section 2615(a)(1) of the
Act, the employer should still be able to avoid liability by demon-
strating that the employee would have been fired anyway for other,
legitimate reasons.161
Although the court draws a supportable analogy between the
FMLA definition of “interference” and the NLRA definition of “in-
terference,”162 the court failed to compare its new FMLA reinstate-
ment proof structure with that of the NLRA.  Under the NLRA,
when an employee alleges that he was terminated for engaging in
protected union activity, the General Counsel must first prove that
an anti-union animus contributed to the employer’s decision to ter-
minate the employee.163  The employer may then avoid liability by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee
158. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
161. This would accord with Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Price Waterhouse addressed the proof structure for so-called “mixed motive” discrimina-
tion cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  In a “mixed-motive” case,
there is evidence that an adverse employment decision was made on the basis of both
illicit and legitimate reasons.  Under Price Waterhouse, a plaintiff must first demonstrate
that her sex (or other protected status) constituted a “motivating factor” in the adverse
employment action. The employer may then mitigate his liability by demonstrating
that, absent the illicit consideration of the protected status, the employee would have
been discharged or demoted for other, legitimate reasons.
162. See Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1123-24 (9th Cir.
2001).
163. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), address-
ing a split amongst the circuits regarding the so-called “Wright Line” test.  Under Wright
Line, the General Counsel bore the burden of proving that an antiunion animus con-
tributed to an employer’s decision to terminate the employee.  The employer could
then avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee
would have been fired even if he had not been involved in union activity. See Wright
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would have been fired anyway even if he had not been involved in
union activity.164  Although the FMLA is subtly different in that
there is a statutory limitation placed on the right itself,165 the limita-
tion, if anything, presents a stronger argument for an affirmative
defense.166
Furthermore, the court in Bachelder completely ignored regula-
tion 825.216, relying solely on the “negative factor” regulation.167
Unlike the “negative factor” regulation, regulation 825.216 contains
the terms “burden of proving,”168 and is introduced under a gen-
eral heading that reads: “Are there any limitations on an employer’s
obligation to reinstate an employee?”169  This heading indicates
that the regulations following it directly address the precise issue
posed by an interference claim alleging a violation of the right to
reinstatement - whether or not the right to reinstatement even ex-
isted.170  On the other hand, the “negative factor” regulation is con-
tained under the heading: “How are employees protected who
request leave or otherwise assert FMLA rights?”171  The regulation
does not address limitations on the right to reinstatement but offers
a list of circumstances that could statutorily be considered “interfer-
ence,” such as “changing the essential functions of the job in order
to preclude the taking of a leave,”172 “reducing hours available to
work in order to avoid employee eligibility,”173 and “transferring
employees from one worksite to another.”174  Although the opinion
expressly expanded the breadth of “interference” for 2615(a)(1)
164. See Transportation Management, 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(3).
166. When an Act contains “exemption” or “exclusion” provisions, it is only sensi-
ble that the party seeking to fall within those provisions (and avoid liability) should bear
the burden of proving his inclusion. See Rice v. Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008, 1019
(7th Cir. 2000) (Evans, J., dissenting)(“The ‘statutory entitlement’ provisions of the
FMLA should be treated . . . similarly to those in the National Labor Relations Act, The
Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act.
Under those Acts, a burden can be placed on employers to prove that a provision does
not apply to them”).
167. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1112.
168. See 29 C.F.R. § 825:216 (2003).
169. Id.
170. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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purposes, it meshed the characterization issue with the burden of
proof issue.  When the regulations are viewed in whole and relative
to their respective subheadings, it becomes clear that the DOL in-
tended regulation 825.216 to govern proof structures for reinstate-
ment claims, not the “negative factor” regulation.
Although the Bachelder approach alleviates the plaintiff’s bur-
den of proof and recognizes the fact that motive often plays a role
in prescriptive reinstatement claims, its proof scheme seeks to find
the answer to the wrong question in a reinstatement suit.  Also, it
relies on a regulation merely intended to describe the realm of im-
permissible conduct by an employer, not the regulation intended to
govern the proof structure.
IV. ACCORDING CHEVRON DEFERENCE TO AGENCY REGULATIONS:
THE APPROACH OF SMITH V. DIFFEE
FORD-LINCOLN-MERCURY
The Family and Medical Leave Act is a relatively new Act.175
Since its passing in 1993,176 courts have been charged with the ar-
duous task of discerning congressional intent through the text of
the Act and its complementary regulations.  Naturally, different
courts have yielded different interpretations of statutory lan-
guage.177  However, a clear mandate must be established amongst
the Circuit courts to guide the lower courts in adjudicating rein-
statement claims under the FMLA.  If no clear mandate is estab-
lished, suits with identical facts may face different fates, leading to
inequitable results and frustrating the purpose and spirit of the Act.
The proof structure articulated by the Tenth Circuit in the
case of Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury should be adopted uni-
formly over the Seventh Circuit’s McDonnell Douglas method and
the Ninth Circuit’s “negative factor” test.  The Tenth Circuit’s ap-
proach pays deference to the pertinent Department of Labor regu-
lation178 and mirrors the proof structure of the National Labor
175. See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 15.
176. Id.
177. See generally, e.g., Bachelder v. America West Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112 (9th cir.
2001); Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 298 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2002); Rice v.
Sunrise Express, 209 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Relations Act179 by first requiring the plaintiff to prove the denial of
a substantive employment right, and then permitting the defen-
dant-employer to relieve himself of liability via an affirmative de-
fense.180  Also, this approach recognizes the pragmatic
considerations involved in FMLA litigation by compelling the party
in control of the evidence, the employer, to bring it forward.181
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach: Smith v.
Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury
In Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury,182 Diantha Smith took a
leave from her position at Diffee as a claims processor following a
diagnosis of breast cancer.183  Diffee dismissed Smith prior to her
return, attributing the decision to her failure to adequately train a
junior employee and the backlog resulting from the junior em-
ployee’s inefficiency.184
The court began its analysis by discussing the two FMLA theo-
ries of redress – “interference” and “retaliation- discrimination.”185
Although the court noted that it had “not explored the entire
range of reasons for dismissal that would support recovery under
the “interference” theory”186 it defined interference as the “denial
of an employee’s substantive rights . . . for a reason connected with
her FMLA leave.”187  The court was not clear as to whether “inter-
ference” extended to situations where an employee is discharged
for exercising her FMLA rights.  However, the court properly con-
ceded that an employee has “no greater protection against his or
her employment being terminated for reasons not related to his or
179. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2003).
180. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
182. Smith, 298 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2002).
183. Id. at 959.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 960.
186. Id. at 961.  One subsequent case adopting the Smith approach construed “the
negative factor” regulation as referring to sections 2615(a)(2)-(b) of the Act as opposed
to the “interference” provision of section 2615 (a)(1). See Parker v. Hahnemann Univ.
Hosp., 234 F.Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J. 2002).
187. Smith, 298 F.3d at 961. Compare this definition of “interference” with Bachel-
der’s definition of “interference,” which characterized “employer actions that deter em-
ployees’ participation in protected activities” as interference or restraint with employee
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her FMLA request than he or she did before submitting the re-
quest.”188  It also recognized that “[i]f an employer interferes with
the FMLA-created right to medical leave or to reinstatement follow-
ing the leave, the intent of the employer is immaterial.”189
On appeal, the defendant-employer cited Rice in support for its
proposition that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
should be applied to Smith’s reinstatement claim.190  The court
noted the circuit split regarding the proof issue, and proceeded to
compare the burden-shifting approach of the Seventh Circuit in
Rice with the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Parris v. Miami Herald
Publishing Company,191 which held that a defendant-employer may
avoid liability by showing that the employee would have been termi-
nated whether or not she took the leave.192  Noting that the Parris
court relied on regulation 825.216, the court emphasized the De-
partment of Labor’s authority to enact regulation 825.216 and the
duty of the judiciary to defer to the DOL when that authority has
been properly exercised.  The court stated:193
188. Id. at 960.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 961. This case illustrates the difficulty lawyers face in characterizing a
claim as either one of “interference” or “discrimination/retaliation,” as well as the un-
predictability of the current law on this issue.  In Smith, although the pleadings did not
explicitly state whether her claim was for “interference” or “retaliation,” the jury was
instructed regarding the interference theory.  Diffee argued on appeal that it had a lack
of adequate notice that the claim would be characterized as such, but the Tenth Circuit
failed to find any prejudice by the lack of notice. Unsure how the Tenth Circuit would
characterize her claim, Diffee argued that, if the claim was properly brought under an
interference theory, the court “erroneously shifted the ultimate burden of persuasion
to Diffee to prove its legitimate reason for terminating Smith” (arguing from Rice). Id.
at 962.  Diffee argued in the alternative that, if the claim was premised on a theory of
“discrimination/retaliation,” the court failed to instruct the jury as to the burden of
proof on “traditional, intent- based discrimination” claims. Id.
191. Parris v. Miami Herald Publ’g Co., 216 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000).
192. Although the Tenth Circuit construed the decision in Parris to support its
holding, the Parris decision relies heavily on an earlier Eleventh Circuit decision,
O’Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2000), which
stated that “when an eligible employee who was on FMLA leave alleges her employer
denied her FMLA right to reinstatement, the employer has an “opportunity” to demon-
strate it would have discharged the employee even if she had not been on leave.”  What
this means is not entirely clear. The Rice court concluded that this statement “does not
state in any definitive fashion that the statutory text was intended to alter the normal
allocation of burdens of proof at trial.” See Rice, 209 F.3d 1018.
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We do not write on a clean slate.  The Act delegates to the
Secretary of Labor the broad authority to ‘prescribe such
regulations as are necessary to carry out’ the Act.  The
regulations . . . were promulgated pursuant to the re-
quirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking under
the Administrative Procedure Act. . .. The regulations
were an exercise of the Secretary’s delegated authority
and were adopted with the participation of the public,
and thus deference to the Secretary’s interpretation is
properly invoked.194
Consistent with Parris, the court held that an employee must
prove that she was denied reinstatement pursuant to a leave in or-
der to prevail at the summary judgment phase.195  If the employer
wishes to escape liability, he must prove that the employee would
have been terminated regardless of her taking leave for a legiti-
mate, unrelated purpose.196  This latter burden is characterized as
an affirmative defense.197  The court expressly repudiated the Mc-
Donnell Douglas approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Rice, find-
ing the Eleventh Circuit’s reading to be “more natural, and its
holding . . . both more reasonable and more harmonious with pre-
cedent.”198  No reference was made to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in Bachelder.199
The court eventually denied Diffee’s request for a new trial on
the FMLA issue, finding that the lower court did not err in refusing
to instruct the jury in accordance with the McDonnell Douglas bur-
den-shifting scheme.200
194. Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 5 (1998)).
195. See Smith, 298 F.3d at 963.
196. Id.
197. Although the court did not use the term “affirmative defense” in the opinion,
the placement of the burden of production and persuasion on an employer to relieve
itself of liability after the plaintiff has shown entitlement to a leave is the functional
equivalent of an affirmative defense.  Further, subsequent cases discussing Smith have
construed the Smith opinion as creating such a defense. See Parker v. Hahnemann
Univ. Hosp., 234 F.Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J. 2002).
198. Smith, 298 F.3d at 963-64.
199. See id. at 955.
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B. The Tenth Circuit Gets It Right
The proof structure adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Smith v.
Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury represents the most favorable approach
for adjudicating reinstatement claims under the FMLA.  The Smith
approach pays deference to the DOL’s clear interpretation of con-
gressional intent on burden allocation,201 accords with the eviden-
tiary scheme of the National Labor Relations Act,202 and places the
ultimate burden of proof on the party in control of the evidence.203
1. Paying Due Deference to DOL Regulation 825:216
In accordance with the principle of Chevron,204 the Smith court
began its analysis by noting that both the Act and its legislative his-
tory are silent on burden allocation in reinstatement cases.205  The
court then examined agency regulation 825.216 and determined
that it was predicated on a fair, reasonable reading of the statute
and was not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
FMLA.”206  Consistent with Chevron, the Smith court accorded the
regulation due deference by giving it a plain meaning construction
and adopting a proof structure consistent with that meaning.  Al-
though the Smith Court did not address regulation 825.220, the
“negative factor” regulation,207 it deferred to the regulation that
was clearly intended by the DOL to govern proof structures – regu-
lation 825.216,208 which contains the express terms “the employer
must be able to show”209 and an “employer would have the burden
of proving.”210
2. Looking Towards the NLRA
Further support for the Smith approach can be located by ref-
erence to other pieces of employment legislation.  The legislative
201. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
204. See Chevron v. U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
205. See Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 298 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir. 2002).
206. Id.
207. See id. at 955.
208. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
209. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216 (a).
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history of the FMLA states that the Act is “based on the same princi-
ple as the child labor laws, the minimum wage, Social Security, the
safety and health laws, . . . and other labor laws that establish mini-
mum standards for employment.”211  The proof structure of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act is particularly relevant to the discussion.
The NLRA grants employees the right to engage in union activ-
ity without reprisal or the fear of reprisal from their employers.  It
confers upon employees a “right to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining.”212  Employees are also granted
the right to refrain from engaging in any such activity.213  Again,
the FMLA, like the NLRA, permits redress for employees on the
theories of “interference” with substantive rights and “discrimina-
tion” for participating in FMLA-generated court proceedings.214  In
the seminal case of NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp.,215 the
Supreme Court held that where an employee alleges that his sub-
stantive right to engage in union activity was violated by his termina-
tion, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
must only prove that the dismissal was motivated by an “antiunion
animus.”216  The employer may then affirmatively defend himself
by proving that the employee would have been terminated anyway
for reasons independent of his union activity.217
The structural similarities in the NLRA and the FMLA indicate
that Congress desired the proof structure for FMLA interference
suits to model that of the NLRA.218  If Congress desired FMLA in-
terference suits to be governed by the McDonnell Douglas test, it
would have modeled the legislation on Title VII of the Civil Rights
211. S. Rep. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3, 6-7.
212. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
213. Id.
214. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158.
215. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
216. Id. at 401-403.
217. Id.
218. Common sense leads to this conclusion.  As the old adage goes, “If it looks like
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Act of 1964.219  Likewise, if they did not desire the proof structure
to contain an affirmative defense, they would not have modeled the
FMLA on the NLRA.220  It is also telling that the Department of
Labor was the agency charged with drafting regulations for the
NLRA and the FMLA as opposed to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission and the Department of Justice - the bodies re-
sponsible for enacting regulations for Title VII221 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),222 two pieces of anti-discrim-
ination legislation.  This fact supports the argument that Congress
did not intend to subject FMLA reinstatement suits to the McDon-
nell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a framework employed in
both ADA and Title VII litigation.223
3. Facilitating Fairness in FMLA Litigation
By availing the employer of an affirmative defense after the
plaintiff has met her burden of proving that she was denied rein-
statement pursuant to a leave, the Smith approach facilitates and
eases the fact-finding process.  Unlike McDonnell Douglas, which re-
quires an employer to merely “offer” a legitimate reason for an ad-
verse employment action,224 and unlike Bachelder, which lessens the
plaintiff’s burden but nonetheless places the ultimate burden of
proof on her,225 the Smith approach compels the employer to fur-
nish all of the evidence he has in an attempt to free himself of lia-
bility.  Judge Diane P. Wood, who penned the en banc dissenting
opinion in Rice,226 noted that:227
219. Id. Title VII, unlike the NLRA and the FMLA, does not afford employees “sub-
stantive” rights.  Rather, it is a proscriptive Act that merely prohibits employers from
discriminating against protected classes in employment decisions. See Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) 1-17 (2003).
220. Id.
221. See id. § 2000e-3.
222. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2003).
223. Supra note 218. Likewise, if it doesn’t look like a duck, act like a duck, or
sound like a duck, it probably isn’t one.
224. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
226. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc by an 8 to 3 vote
on June 23, 2000, in Rice v. Sunrise Express, 217 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Oddly enough, the original dissenter, Judge Evans, did not join the dissent in the denial
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When burdens of proof are allocated, it is normally most effi-
cient to place the burdens of production and persuasion on the
party with the best access to relevant information.  Here, the em-
ployer is far better situated to know whether an overall change in
company policy would have meant the elimination of a job, or an-
other right or benefit, notwithstanding the FMLA leave of a particu-
lar employee.  It will be difficult at best for employees to gain access
to that kind of information without filing a lawsuit and obtaining
the assistance of the discovery rules.228
In conclusion, the proof structure adopted by the Smith court
is the most desirable approach.  The reasons outlined above for
favoring the Tenth Circuit’s approach over those of the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits are cogently stated by Judge Jerome B. Simandle
in a recent case from the district court for the District of New
Jersey, Parker v. Hahnemann University Hospital.229 In rejecting the
Rice/ McDonnell Douglas approach to reinstatement claims and
adopting the test advocated by the Tenth Circuit in Smith,230 the
court stated:
An issue about the burden of proof is a ‘question of policy and
fairness’231 based on experience in the different situations, and pol-
icy, fairness and experience support the Tenth Circuit’s approach.
As for policy, the approach upholds the validity and the plain lan-
guage of the regulation that was promulgated in accordance with
standard administrative procedure. As for fairness, the approach
places the burden on the party who holds the evidence that is essen-
tial to the inquiry, evidence about future plans for a position, dis-
cussions at management meetings, and events at the workplace
during the employee’s FMLA leave.  As for experience, other labor
statutes also place the burden on the employer to mitigate its liabil-
ity to pay an employment benefit in certain situations.232
227. Judge Wood’s dissenting opinion in the denial of the petition for rehearing en
banc was joined by Judge Ilana Diamond Rover and Judge Ann Claire Williams.
228. See id. at 494 (Wood, J., dissenting).
229. See Parker v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 234 F.Supp.2d 478 (D.N.J. 2002).
230. See id. at 487.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 is the product of
ten years of congressional debates, negotiations, and revisions.233
It’s passing represented a victory for all proponents of equality
amongst men and women inside and outside of the workplace.
Federal courts undermine the letter and spirit of the Act by defying
the authority of the Department of Labor and its reasonable inter-
pretations of Congressional intent.  The principles of “policy, fair-
ness and experience”234 demand that the U.S. Circuit courts
uniformly adopt the proof structure advocated by the Tenth Cir-
cuit.  The Tenth Circuit’s scheme represents a proper reading of
the Department of Labor regulation intended to govern burden al-
location,235 accords with Congress’s intent that the FMLA mirror
the evidentiary schemes of other labor related “entitlement” Acts,
such as the National Labor Relations Act,236 and compels the party
in control of the evidence to furnish it.237
233. See Lenhoff & Withers, supra note 15.
234. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 2486 at 275.
235. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
